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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Max Ritchie Cooke appeals from the judgment entered upon a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault. 
Cooke challenges the admission of prior threats against the victim and the 
prosecutor's reference to those threats. Cooke also appeals from the denial of 
post-conviction relief claiming the district court erred in concluding his counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to investigate or challenge the victim's competency 
to testify at trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedinas 
The statement of facts and course of Cooke's criminal and post-conviction 
proceedings are set forth in the Respondent's Brief, filed October 10, 2008. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1-10.) On March 11, 2009, Cooke filed a motion to file a 
supplemental brief to "discuss the impact" of two opinions, State v. Grist, 147 
ldaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), and State v. Parmer, 147 ldaho 210, 207 P.3d 
186 (Ct. App. 2009), in his claim that certain evidence was improperly admitted.' 
(Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief and Statement in Support Thereof 
filed March 11, 2009.) The Court of Appeals granted Cooke's motion. (Order to 
Vacate Oral Argument and Allow Leave to File Supplemental Briefing filed March 
17, 2009.) Cooke filed his supplemental brief on April 21, 2009. (Supplemental 
Appellant's Brief (hereinafter "Supplemental Brief').) 
' Grist and Parmer were both decided after Cooke filed his opening brief. 
The particular facts relevant to the issues raised in Cooke's supplemental 
brief are as follows. Prior to trial, the state filed a "Brief in Support of ldaho Rule 
404(b) Evidence" in which it advised Cooke and the court of its "view of 
anticipated facts at trial, together with ldaho case law on the admissibility of 
ldaho Criminal Rule 404(b) misconduct, by the defendant." (R., pp.13-18.) 
Specifically, the state asserted: 
The facts will show that in the early morning hours of 
January 18, 2003, the defendant drove a pickup truck off of Ustick 
Road, through a fence, approximately 80 yards through a field, and 
into a tree. His wife, Alison Cooke, was the passenger in the 
pickup truck. She was seriously injured when the truck struck the 
tree. Ada County Sheriffs [sic] deputies [sic] observations at the 
scene were that the driver of the pickup had sufficient time to stop 
the truck before it traveled the approximately 80 yards through the 
field. They also observed that the tracks in the pasture grass in the 
field showed that the truck corrected its course to line up on the 
tree prior to striking the tree. Finally, and most important, the 
deputies observed that the tracks indicated that the pickup truck 
accelerated in the field prior to striking the tree. 
After the crash, the defendant was interviewed and gave 
various stories, but the central theme was that he left the road 
accidentally and apparently hit the gas pedal instead of the brake 
pedal prior to striking the tree. He maintains the crash into the tree 
was an accident. 
The State's evidence would show that the defendant made 
several threats to Alison Cooke in the approximately six weeks prior 
to the crash. The defendant was suspicious that his wife was 
calling or seeing another man. The threats made to Alison were 
that he would kill her if he found out that she was talking to another 
man or seeing another man. The defendant not only made these 
threats directly to Alison Cooke, but he also told other people that 
he would kill Alison if he found out that she was speaking to 
another man. He also threatened to kill himself. 
Due to the trouble in the marriage, Alison Cooke left the 
defendant and went to live with her brother in Meridian. . . . During 
November and December the defendant threatened that he would 
kill her if he found out that she was seeing another man. 
Immediately prior to kidnapping Alison, the defendant called 
the man that the defendant believed Alison was dating. The 
defendant told that man that if the defendant found out that Allison 
[sic] was speaking to that man, that the defendant would make 
"headline news." The crash took place within a couple of hours of 
that telephone call. 
The State believes that those statements made by the 
defendant are evidence that the defendant's crash into the tree was 
not an accident as the defendant claims, but rather show the 
defendant's intent and his lack of absence of mistake or accident. 
ldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) together with ldaho case law 
permits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
to prove what the defendant's intent was or to prove his absence of 
mistake or accident. 
(#34820 R., pp.14-76.) 
At the hearing where the parties discussed the threats, the prosecutor 
further detailed the nature of the evidence the state intended to offer: 
And about November of 2002, particularly about Thanksgiving-time 
until the crash, which was the middle of January, so roughly six or 
seven weeks, the defendant made a number of statements about 
his intention to kill Alison Cooke if she attempted to leave him or if 
he found out that she was talking to a fellow on the telephone who 
he was suspicious of. That fellow's name is Shane. And he made 
those statements to her. And he made the statements to a couple 
of her friends and a couple of her relatives, her brother and sister. 
On the very night that [the wreck] happened, which was - - 
actually, it occurred early in the morning on Saturday, but it was 
Friday night - - the defendant made a call to this Shane, who he 
believed was - - or who he believed either was trying to have an 
affair with Alison or that Alison was talking to him on the telephone 
and said to this Shane on the telephone, "if I find out that Alison has 
been talking to you, I'll make headline news." That was within a 
couple of hours of the crash, itself. 
The prosecutor further noted he was "not positive that those statements 
are other crimes or wrongs or misconduct" because "[tlhey seem to be all part 
and parcel of the same set of circumstances that led up to the crash but, "[o]n 
the other hand, some of the -- some of the statements are separated by as much 
as six weeks, some just by a couple of hours." (#34820 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-8.) 
Cooke objected to the admission of the statements, claiming admission of 
the statements would require proof of the "predicate 'ifs,"' i.e., "if' Cooke ever 
found Alison was having an affair, which Cooke contended "would be 
unnecessarily belonging of the event here." (#34820 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-17.) Cooke 
also argued the statements would be unduly prejudicial. (#34820 Tr., p.10, L.17 
- p.1 I ,  L.3.) 
The court noted the admissibility of the prior threats was "committed to [its] 
discretion . . . based upon the provisions of 404" and concluded "any threats 
made to Alison Cooke are relevant, and . . . their probative value outweighs the 
prejudicial effect in this case." (#34820 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-25.) The court also 
indicated the state would be required to prove Cooke accelerated prior to hitting 
the tree before the court would permit Shane to testify regarding the threat Cooke 
communicated to him the evening of the collision. (#34820 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-25.) 
At trial, Christine Heavin, Alison's sister, testified she overheard a 
telephone conversation between Cooke and Alison in which Cooke "was 
screaming . . . that if he found out [Alison] was talking to or seeing Shane, he 
would kill both of them." (#34820 Tr., p.114, Ls.22-25.) Christine further testified 
that Cooke also called and told her that "he felt that Alison and Shane had been 
seeing each other and that if he found out they had been, he would kill Shane" 
and that "Alison [would] be sorry for what happens." (#34820 Tr., p.116, L.25 - 
p.117, L.5.) Stacy Wilson, Cooke's and Alison's neighbor, and Kathy 
Bosserman, a friend of Cooke's and Alison's, also both testified they heard 
Cooke threaten to kill Alison andlor Shane if he found out they were having a 
relationship. (#34820 Tr., p.127, Ls.10-18 (Cooke tells Stacy if he ever caught 
Alison "cheating" on him, he would "kill 'em"); p.275, Ls.121-13 (Kathy hears 
message from Cooke to Alison telling her he would "kill her" if "he ever caught 
her doing anything"); p.275, Ls.1-I I (same).) 
Shane and Alison also testified regarding Cooke's threats. Specifically, 
Shane testified Cooke threatened his life and that on the night of the wreck, 
Cooke called him and said "if he found out [Shane] was even talking to [Alison], 
he was going to make headline news." (#34820 Tr., p.297, Ls.15-16.) Cooke 
called Shane a second time that same night and again threatened to kill Shane 
and told Shane if he found out he "had been with Ali that night that he would kill 
[him]." (#34820 Tr., p.298, Ls.19-24.) 
Consistent with the testimony of the other witnesses, Alison testified that 
Cooke told her "[ilf he found [her] with anybody else, he would hurt [her] to make 
sure that [she] wouldn't be with anybody." (#34820 Tr., p.336, Ls.14-15.) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES 
Cooke states the supplemental issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court adopt either a clear and convincing 
evidence standard, or a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, to the threshold determination of whether a prior 
bad act has been proved by the State for purposes of Rule 
404(b)? 
2. Under any standard of proof, was there sufficient evidence 
presented to support the admissibility of the prior bad acts 
evidence introduced by the State at trial, and did the district 
court make the requisite factual findings in support of the 
admissibility of this evidence? 
(Supplemental Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the supplemental issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court decline to address the standard of proof required to 
admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) since Cooke's threats do not constitute 
404(b) evidence? Alternatively, should this Court reject Cooke's invitation to 
adopt a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence standard since the 
relevant standard for admissibility is already provided for in I.R.E. 104? 
2. Has Cooke failed to establish the district court erred in admitting evidence 
of Cooke's threats? 
ARGUMENT 
Cooke Has Failed To Establish Error In Relation To The Admission Of His Prior 
Threats To Kill Alison And Shane 
A. Introduction 
In his Supplemental Brief, Cooke asks this Court to (1) determine the 
standard applicable to determining whether evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 
404(b); and (2) conclude that under any standard, "the proof presented by the 
State [was] insufficient to establish" Cooke made any threats and, consequently, 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting the statements. (Supplemental 
Brief, pp.5-13.) Because Cooke's prior threats to kill Alison were part and parcel 
to the crimes charged, they are not properly characterized as prior bad acts 
subject to a Rule 404(b) analysis. Even if the threats are subject to Rule 404(b), 
the standards governing admissibility of the statements are set forth in I.R.E. 
104. Application of the correct standards to Cooke's statements reveals the 
statements were properly admitted. Cooke has failed to establish otherwise. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the 
district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. & 
C. Cooke's Prior Threats Do Not Constitute 404(b) Evidence 
As an initial matter, this Court should consider whether Cooke's 
threatening statements at issue in this appeal are the type of evidence subject to 
consideration under I.R.E. 404(b). The state submits they are not. 
Rule 404(b), I.R.E., provides, in relevant part: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided 
that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice 
reasonably in advance of trial, . . . , of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(Bold in original.) 
The ldaho Supreme Court explained the source of Rule 404(b) in Grist, 
stating: 
This rule has its source in the common law. The common law rule 
was that the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is not 
admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged. 
The policy underlying the common law rule was the protection of 
the criminal defendant. The prejudicial effect of character evidence 
is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to 
have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal 
character. Character evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from 
their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular 
crime on trial. 
Grist, 147 ldaho at -, 205 P.3d at 1188 (emphasis added, citations and -
quotations omitted). 
Thus, evidence is only properly considered "404(b) evidence" if it is 
evidence of "criminal character." However, where, as here, the evidence is not 
evidence of "criminal character," but is instead statements made by the 
defendant that are, as the prosecutor described them, "part and parcel" of the 
alleged offenses, the evidence does not fit within the parameters of Rule 404(b). 
As explained in State v. Sheldon, 145 ldaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008): 
The comments to the 1991 amendments to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) 
state the notice requirement "does not extend to evidence of acts 
which are 'intrinsic' to the charged offense." Federal courts in 
several jurisdictions have discussed the nature of "intrinsic" 
evidence. "Evidence of an act is intrinsic when it and evidence of 
the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part 
of a single criminal episode, or it was a necessary preliminary to the 
crime charged." U.S. v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(citing United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2005)); 
accord U.S. v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. 
Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before it, the ldaho Supreme 
Court concluded Sheldon's "possession of a large amount of cash is not a prior 
crime, wrong or other act." Sheldon, 145 ldaho at 228, 178 P.3d at 31. "It is 
physical, circumstantial evidence" which the jury could conclude "was part of 
Sheldon's alleged criminal activity," trafficking in methamphetamine. Id- The 
evidence was therefore properly admitted so long as it was relevant and not 
unduly prejudicial. 
Similarly, Cooke's threats were part and parcel and intrinsic to the crimes 
charged. The admissibility of the statements are, therefore, subject only to the 
requirements of I.R.E. 401 and 403 and were properly admitted in accordance 
with these rules. See, e.q., State v. Nez, 130 ldaho 950, 953-54, 950 P.2d 1289, 
1292-93 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding probation officer's testimony regarding 
Nez's conduct on probation was "all part and parcel of the probation violation for 
which he was charged" and was, therefore, "relevant and also not evidence of 
'bad character' as contemplated by Rule 404(b)"); State v. Flovd, 125 ldaho 651, 
653-54, 873 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Ct. App. 1994) (analyzing defendant's statements 
regarding sexual encounter with victim under I.R.E. 401 and 403 and concluding 
statements were "direct evidence of the rape charge," not "evidence of some 
'other crimes, wrongs or acts"'). See also State v. Marlar, 94 ldaho 803, 498 
P.2d 1276 (1972) (noting "Prior threats of the accused or evidence of previous 
trouble are always relevant to illustrate mental attitude of the accused toward the 
prosecuting witness at the time of the assault" and noting "prior threats may 
comprise part of the mosaic of the criminal event in that they may tend to 
establish an accused's attitude toward the victim or an intent to inflict harm upon 
him."). But see State v. Avila, 137 ldaho 410, 413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Ct. App. 
2002) (analyzing statements made during sexual battery under Rule 404(b) and 
concluding the statements were not offered for an improper purpose since "Rule 
404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct evidence if the 
misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that a complete 
account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure 
of the uncharged misconduct"). Because Cooke's threats were part of the same 
criminal episode and intrinsic to the crime, I.R.E. 404(b) does not apply to 
evidence of those threats. Cooke's argument should be rejected on this basis. 
D. And Even If Cooke's Prior Threats Constitute 404(b) Evidence, Cooke Has 
Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Admittinn Them 
Even if Cooke's prior threats are subject to Rule 404(b), Cooke's request 
that this Court adopt a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence standard as a prerequisite to admission should be rejected just as it 
was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 
485 U.S. 681 (1 988). 
In Huddleston, the petitioner asserted that prior to admitting evidence 
under Rule 404(b), the trial court must determine the admissibility of evidence 
under Rule 104(a) based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard.' 485 
U.S. at 687. The Supreme Court rejected Huddleston's argument as 
"inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of Evidence and with the plain 
language of Rule 404(b)." u Specifically, the Court reasoned: 
The text [of Rule 404(b)] contains no intimation . . . that any 
preliminary showing is necessary before such evidence may be 
introduced for a proper purpose. If offered for such a proper 
purpose, the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting 
admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403. 
Petitioner's reading of Rule 404(b) as mandating a 
preliminary finding by the trial court that the act in question 
occurred not only superimposes a level of judicial oversight that is 
nowhere apparent from the language of that provision, but it is 
simply inconsistent with the legislative history behind Rule 404(b). 
Id. at 687-88. -
The Court in Huddleston, therefore, "conclude[d] that a preliminary finding 
by the court that the Government has proved the act by a preponderance of the 
evidence is not called for under Rule 104(a)." Id. at 689. The Supreme Court 
Huddleston initially argued in his briefing that the "Government was required to 
prove to the trial court the commission of the similar act by clear and convincing 
proof." 485 U.S. at 687 n.5. At oral argument, however, Huddleston "conceded 
that such a position [was] untenable in light of [the Court's] decision . . . in 
Bourjaily v. United Sfafes, . . ., in which [the Court] concluded that preliminary 
factual findings under Rule 104(a) are subject to the preponderance-of-the- 
evidence standard." Id. 
further stated, "In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient 
evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes 
a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 690. Rather, "[tlhe court simply examines 
all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find 
the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (emphasis 
added). Thus, the standard for admissibility of Rule 404(b) does not require the 
court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior bad act occurred; 
it only requires the court to conclude "the jury could reasonably find," by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the act occurred. 
Although Cooke cites cases indicating some states3 have declined to 
follow Huddleston (Supplemental Brief, pp.6-7), ldaho courts traditionally refer to 
federal courts for guidance regarding the appropriate interpretation of Idaho's 
rules where those rules mirror their federal counterparts. See, e.&, Herrerra v. 
&, 146 ldaho 674, 201 P.3d 647 (2009) ("Given the virtual identity between 
[I.R.C.P. 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)] and their counterparts in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and the lack of case law in ldaho, it is appropriate for this Court 
to turn to federal authority to address the standard of review" (citations and 
footnote omitted)); Black v. Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 ldaho 51 1, 515, 81 P.3d 416, 
420 (2003) (referring to federal case law to interpret ldaho Rule I l(a)( l)  because 
"the federal and ldaho rules are substantially similar"); State v. Parkinson, 128 
Cooke also cites an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429 
f8th Cir. 1995). which ourDorts to follow a Dreoonderance of the evidence , . 
standard. ( ~ u ~ ~ l e m e n t a l  Brief, p.6.)   ow eve;, th'e applicable standard cited in 
that case traces back to the standard articulated in Huddleston. 
ldaho 29, 34, 909 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1996) (referring to United States 
Supreme Court precedent on the interpretation of I.R.E. 702). Indeed the ldaho 
State Bar Evidence Committee itself relied on federal precedent in adopting and 
explaining the meaning of I.R.E. 404(b). See Grist, 147 Idaho at -, 205 P.3d 
at 1188 (citing M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, 
C 404, p.4, relying on United States v. Beechum, 282 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1 ~ 7 8 ) , ~  
as authority for the requirement that "the trial court must determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact" in determining 
its admissibility). 
Because Rules 404 and 104, I.R.E., are identical to Federal Rules 404 
and 104, there is no basis for adopting a different standard governing the 
admissibility of evidence under Idaho's rules than is required for the Federal 
Rules. To the extent Parmer can be read as requiring a different standard, this 
Court should disavow any such interpretation. 
Regardless of the standard applied to Cooke's prior threats, Cooke has 
failed to establish the district court erred in admitting the statements. As 
explained in the Respondent's Brief, the statements were offered for a proper 
purpose, were relevant, and were not unduly prejudicial. (- Respondent's 
Brief, pp.12-15.) In its proffer, the state indicated some of its witnesses would 
testify that Cooke, prior to the crimes at issue, threatened to kill Alison and 
Shane. The court could conclude from this proffer that the jury could find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or even clear and convincing evidence, that 
' The state notes the authority relied on in Grist predates the Supreme Court's 
decision in Huddleston. 
13 
Cooke in fact did so. Huddelston, 485 U.S. at 690; see also United States v. 
O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (7'h Cir. 1980) ("Direct testimony of the defendants' 
participation in the prior schemes is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing 
standard.") Although the court did not "articulate a separate finding that sufficient 
evidence existiedl to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occ~rred,"~ the 
"court was acting without the benefit of the Grist opinion," much less the Court of 
Appeals' opinion in Parmer. Parmer, 147 Idaho at -, 207 P.3d at 191. 
Nevertheless, the district court made the required findings when it "articulated the 
purpose other than propensity, for admission of the evidence." Specifically, 
the court noted the evidence was relevant to show Cooke's intent. (#34820 Tr., 
p.12, Ls.16-22.) The court also expressly concluded the evidence was not 
unduly prejudicial. (#34820 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-8.) The court's conclusions in this 
The state disagrees with the Court of Appeals' conclusion in Parmer that Grist 
requires as much, but acknowledges review of this issue was denied. Contrary 
to the conclusion reached in Parmer, Grist does not "disfavor[ ] an implied 
acceptance that sufficient evidence exists to establish a prior bad act as fact by 
mere virtue of the trial court's determination of the probative value of the 
evidence," such that "a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient 
evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred." 
Parmer, 147 ldaho at -, 207 P.3d at 191. It is unclear why the standard for 
admissibility determinations under I.R.E. 104 should be applied differently where 
the evidence is 404(b) evidence, and it does not appear the Court in Parmer 
analyzed why such a distinction should exist. "Rule 404(b) is a relevance rule." 
w, 137 ldaho at 412, 49 P.3d at 1262. As such, a finding that evidence is 
relevant and admissible pursuant to Rule 104 should, like other relevance 
determinations, suffice without the district court taking the extra step of making a 
"separate finding that sufficient evidence exists to support a reasonable 
conclusion that the act occurred." Parmer, 147 Idaho at -, 207 P.3d at 191. A 
finding that the evidence is relevant necessarily includes a finding that there is 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude the act alleged by the 
evidence occurred. 
regard are sufficient under Grist and under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
Grist as articulated in Parmer. Cooke has failed to establish otherwise. -
Because Cooke's prior threats are not properly characterized as 404(b) 
evidence, this Court need not decide what standard applies to the admissibility of 
404(b) evidence. Even if this Court determines Cooke's threats do constitute 
404(b) evidence, the applicable standard is that set forth in I.R.E. 104 and 
Huddleston, and Cooke has failed to establish that standard was not met. Cooke 
has, therefore, failed to establish error in relation to the admission of his prior 
threats. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Cooke's convictions for 
second-degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and assault and the district 
court's order denying post-conviction relief. 
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